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CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
AND PHYSICAL THERAPY 
Mike W. Martin & Donald L. Gabard 
M ost philosophical attention to health care ethics has fo-cused on physicians and nurses, neglecting the moral is-
sues faced by physical therapists and other members of allied health care 
fields. The neglect is compounded by misperceptions that physical ther-
apists are technicians rather than professionals, that they do not have 
fiduciary relationships with patients, and that they lack all discretion in 
allocation matters. In fact, physical therapists possess discretionary power 
in treatment selection, advising, and duration and intensity of therapy-
all areas in which trust and trustworthiness are paramount. In addition, 
their work tends to make possible longer time spent with patients. And 
their contributions to health care are distinctive in terms of the tech-
niques used in restoring persons to a more functional, pain-free, inde-
pendent life, as well as in preventing injury and pain. For all these rea-
sons, the neglect of physical therapy ethics fosters a lack of vigilance that 
sometimes masks abuses, such as those arising from conflicts of interest. 
The definition of conflicts of interest is itself contested, quite apart 
from physical therapy ethics. We begin by proposing a definition and 
providing a rationale for it, using examples from several professions. Then 
we make a few general comments about evaluating conflicts of interest. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses issues of current interest in phys-
ical therapy under six headings: (1) advising and providing, (2) physician 
referral, (3) equipment and supplies, (4) gifts, (5) inappropriate sexual 
behavior, and ( 6) teaching and research. The categories are not exhaus-
tive, but they suffice to illustrate an array of recurring problem areas. 
Defining Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest have always arisen in all forms of work, but the 
expression "conflict of interest" has somewhat recent vintage, as Neil R. 
Luebke (1987) points out. Only since the 1930s did the phrase acquire 
currency in law and then spread to other professions. Its original usage 
targeted relationships of trust in which a fiduciary acquired interests in 
property (money, jobs, etc.) or persons (family, friends, etc.) inimical to 
meeting duties to clients, employers, or the general public. Thus, judges 
should not try cases involving their own children, and attorneys should 
not accept two clients whose financial interests directly clash. Luebke 
(1987) contends that we should retain this original meaning. In his view, 
conflicts of interest involve (1) fiduciary relationships and (2) "objective 
interests" (rather than mere subjective biases), such as "some material 
right, benefit, asset, or share possessed by the fiduciary or by others with 
whom he/she is legally or closely associated (family members, business 
partners, employer, benefactor, client, or the like)" (p. 69). 
Other philosophers broaden the definition by expanding the range of 
interests that threaten responsibilities; simultaneously they narrow the 
definition in other ways. Thomas Carson (1994), for example, expands 
interests to include altruistic desires, such as a company official's desire 
to help a nonprofit charity by donating corporate funds and also mali-
cious desires such as to harm someone by not awarding their company 
a contract. At the same time, he also restricts conflicts of interest to 
employees, thereby excluding self-employed professionals. Again, Michael 
Davis (1982, 1998) expands the relevant interests to include virtually any 
desire or duty, attitude or aim, bias or benefit having a tendency to ad-
versely affect judgment within a role. Yet he restricts conflicts of interest 
to situations involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, apparently 
ruling out occasions when one's responsibility is entirely obvious and 
requires no exercise of judgment. 
We share Luebke' s worry about losing the usefulness of the concept 
by stretching it too far. Nevertheless, his attempt to limit interests to 
material matters, "objective" relationships, and fiduciary relationships is 
needlessly restrictive, as is Carson's restriction to employee status and 
Davis's limitation to matters of judgment-even though these factors 
have great moral significance in the cases we discuss. In particular, we 
agree with Davis that most conflicts of interest involve matters of judg-
ment, where judgment is "the capacity to make correctly decisions not 
as likely to be made correctly by a simple clerk with a book of rules and 
access to all the facts" (Davis, 1982, p. 27). Yet, conflicts of interest also 
arise in routine matters when sophisticated judgment is not required, and 
when by-the-book decisions straightforwardly indicate one's obligation in 
the situation. It can be entirely obvious what should be done, even to the 
agent who through weakness of will or outright greed fails to do what 
is right. 
Regarding motives, we note that typically professionals have mixed 
motives in all areas of their work: compensation motives (income, rec-
ognition), craft motives (commitment to excellence), and moral concern 
(caring, integrity). (Martin, 2000). These multiple motives interact in 
complicated ways, usually reinforcing each other but occasionally point-
ing in opposing directions. In most conflicts of interest, compensation 
motives threaten responsibilities within professions and organizations, al-
though occasionally altruism conflicts with professional responsibilities, 
as Carson points out. Complete explanations of any ensuing wrongdoing 
need to be contextual and to make reference to motives linked to both 
social influences and personal character. (Martin, 1999). 
In our view, the crux of conflicts of interest resides in significant 
threats to role responsibilities, where role responsibilities are well-
delineated duties attached to formal assignments within organizations or 
social practices, such as professions. Accordingly, we adopt the following 
definition: "Conflicts of interest are situations in which individuGi!ls have 
interests that significantly threaten their role responsibilities, or would do 
so for a typical person having their role." Although the definition is sim-
ple, thereby adding to its usefulness, we offer the following comments by 
way of further clarification and rationale. 
Areas of vagueness in a definition can actually be helpful by identi-
fying areas in which practical controversies are likely to arise. Consider 
the word "interest." Ordinarily, we might not speak of a conflict of in-
terest when professionals' duties are only somewhat threatened by inter-
ests centered in personal life, such as family difficulties, desires for illegal 
drugs and excessive use of alcohol, or sundry bigotries. Our definition 
allows for this by speaking of "significant" threats (dangers, hindrances) 
to duty. We reasonably expect and demand professionals to maintain pro-
fessional distance, that is, to avoid allowing personal biases and interests 
to distort their work (Martin, 1997). Some conflicts of interest arise when 
distance is placed at risk, as when individuals know (or should know) 
that their prejudices or addictions are beginning to significantly threaten 
their work, perhaps by tempting them to issue biased rulings (judges, 
referees) or to steal drugs from a hospital (health professionals). 
Why does the definition refer to both individuals and typical persons? 
Consider a judge of such exceptional integrity that we know she would 
be fair in adjudicating a dispute involving a family member. The jutlge is 
still in a conflict of interest in cases involving family members because, 
according to ordinary usage, a typical judge in that situation would be 
at risk of failing to properly fulfill his or her role responsibilities. Con-
versely, some professionals are inclined to lose distance in particular areas 
(perhaps a specific religious matter) in which a typical professional would 
not, and hence the definition also refers to the individual involved. 
The term "formal role" also deserves comment. We intend rule-
structured activities with assigned responsibilities within social organi-
zations-understood broadly to include professions, corporations, and 
voluntary organizations-that assign responsibilities and authority. Do 
families involve formal roles? We do not think of them that way, at least 
given their great variability within contemporary Western societies, but 
others might. For example, others might speak of a conflict of interest 
when Christian Scientists or Jehovah's Witnesses withhold essential med-
ical care (on religious grounds) from their young children. In a similar 
vein, Davis (1993) suggests that parents face a conflict of interest when 
their desire to take a weekend trip threatens their judgment about their 
child's medical care. We consider these applications of conflicts of interest 
a bit expansive, but our definition helps us pinpoint the source of dis-
agreement. 
Again, is citizenship a formal role? We do not think so, because the 
role delineations and duties involved are too diffuse and disputed, but 
others might disagree. Consider Antigone, who has conflicting obligations 
(and conflicting interests): a citizenship duty to obey King Creon, who 
forbids the burial of her brother, and a religious duty which requires 
burying her brother. In our view, Antigone faces a conflict of duty (a 
moral dilemma) but not a conflict of interest. There would be a conflict 
of interest, however, if Antigone had been the King's Deputy of Burials. 
If others disagree, our definition at least helps explain why the disagree-
ment arises. 
Evaluating Systemic and 
Episodic Conflicts 
Joseph Margolis (1979) suggested that Antigone is not caught in a conflict 
of interest for a different reason. In his view, conflicts of interest are 
restricted to situations in which it is morally wrong to follow the conflict-
ing interests together. We disagree: Some conflicts of interest are inevi-
table or otherwise tolerable, and hence permit pursuing both interests (cf. 
Davis, 1982). This leads us to offer a few general comments on the moral 
evaluation of conflicts of interest. 
Why do conflicts of interest have such great moral significance? Part 
of the answer is clear from the definition: They threaten responsibilities. 
Another part of the answer is that even the appearance of conflicts of 
interest can endanger the trust which is so important in professional 
relationships. However, to say that conflicts of interest are morally prob-
lematic, especially in raising issues of trust, does not settle how to resolve 
them. For there might be additional moral considerations, whether ad-
ditional responsibilities or rights, that override the threat to role respon-
sibilities and permit pursuing the (conflicting) interest. To illustrate that 
point, let us distinguish between episodic and systemic conflicts. 
In this chapter we are interested in recurring conflicts of interest, ones 
that arise with frequency rather than by occasional happenstance. Re-
currence takes two forms. Episodic conflicts of interest arise in particular 
situations as a result of voluntary choices (beyond simply choosing to 
serve in a formal role), yet they can be recurring in the sense of wide-
spread. Giving and accepting personal gifts is a familiar example we will 
discuss. By contrast, systemic conflicts of interest arise from the very 
structure of formal roles. For example, there is an ongoing temptation in 
all professions to provide unnecessary services to clients in order to in-
crease profits. 
The last example, which we discuss in the next section, illustrates how 
systemic conflicts of interest can be inescapable, short of overthrowing 
or radically modifying social practices and economic systems (which often 
generates new systemic conflicts). As a second example, it is cost-effective 
for the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to select some employees of airline 
manufacturers to serve as government inspectors. (Martin & Schinzinger, 
1996). Here the conflict of interest is internal to the individual's profes-
sional roles: professional duty versus professional duty, rather than duty 
versus personal gain. The dual roles of government inspector and cor-
porate employees constitute a conflict of interest, but when individuals 
are carefully selected, the practice saves taxpayers the costs of a wholly 
independent set of inspectors for complex technology (or risking public 
safety by doing without inspectors). 
In general, systemic conflicts of interest are tolerable when the relevant 
systems (institutions, economic structures, etc.) are morally permissible 
and when effective procedures of overseeing abuses are in place (laws, 
self-regulations within professions, consumer-group publications). We 
will largely take for granted the economic systems of Western democra-
cies that combine capitalism (free enterprise), government regulation, and 
professional self-regulation currently established in the United States. 
Nevertheless, we are less sanguine about current substructures in health 
care, in particular many aspects of current managed health care. Capi-
talism takes many forms, and the rapid changes currently under way 
confirm that the United States has yet to achieve anything like an ideal 
form with regard to health care. 
Calling a conflict of interest tolerable or inevitable does not banish 
moral concern. Such conflicts continue to be of concern because respon-
sibilities continue to be at risk. Inevitable and inescapable d:mflicts of 
interest call for moral vigilance and conscientiousness by committed pro-
fessionals and equally vigilant disciplinary structures. Notoriously, these 
things are in short supply in long-established professions, and difficulties 
are compounded in still developing professions such as physical therapy. 
Regarding episodic conflicts, alternative moral responses include the 
following options: (1) escape from them, typically by relinquishing the 
conflicting interest that threatens the role responsibility; (2) avoid them 
in the first place; (3) disclose them to appropriate parties (e.g., employers 
and clients); or (4) take other steps, as appropriate, if only exercising 
special caution to ensure that role responsibilities are properly met (Davis, 
1998). As we proceed, we will discuss which option is appropriate in a 
particular situation. We add a prefatory caveat about disclosure, which 
is too readily taken to be sufficient. 
Health care exists because someone is vulnerable and in need of care. 
Furthermore, harm caused by mistakes frequently cannot be undone, 
unlil<:e financial or legal matters. As a result, disclosure of conflict of 
interests is generally not enough. To undermine the trust on which care 
is built is to diminish the care, regardless of whether professionals profit. 
Unlike a profession such as law or banking, where it is desirable for all 
parties to be vigilant and where full disclosure helps ensure that vigilance, 
in health care the primary concern and focus are to achieve better health 
or function. To minimize the threat to trust, there is a strong presumption 
that therapists and other health care professionals should do everything 
possible to avoid conflicts of interests as they relate to patient care. 
In short, to call something a conflict of interest is to raise a (moral) 
red flag, but it does not indicate how the flag is to be waved. As an 
analogy, consider the word "deception." All deception raises moral ques-
tions, but the questions are sometimes easily answered and other times 
sharply contested. Deception is permissible in a game of poker; it is oblig-
atory when it is the only way to defeat a tyrant in order to save many 
innocent lives; its moral status is subject to debate when it is used to 
conceal personal sexual matters (as recent debates about President Clin-
ton revealed). Exactly when and why conflicts of interest are morally 
objectionable needs to be explored contextually, a task to which we now 
turn. 
Advising and Providing: 
Intervention, Outcome, 
and Payment 
In physical therapy, as in other professions, the most basic systemic con-
flicts of interest center on the primary good served. Described in general 
terms, this good is shared within all health fields: to promote health while 
respecting patient rights. Described more specifically, the good served by 
physical therapy is to restore persons to a more functional, pain-free, and 
independent life, and also to prevent injuries and pain. Three interwoven 
questions arise immediately: 
r. When is health care intervention warranted and at what level? 
2. Who defines acceptable outcomes-patient, provider, or reimburse-
ment organization? 
3. What is the cost, and who pays? 
Most of us, healthy and functional within the expectations of others, 
our age, and our level of activity, could profit from physical therapy serv-
ices in prevention (proper body mechanics) or even improvement in such 
things as balance and gait. Who defines the threshold for services? If left 
to patients, all will draw a different line in the sand. Even when there is 
obvious disability, some patients are quickly resigned to a life of needless 
dysfunction; others want not mere average abilities but athletically com-
petitive skills. Needs for physical therapy can be highly specialized, even 
within the specialties recognized by the national organization and 
achieved through extensive specialized training and monitored clinical 
experience. For example, within sports medicine, some physical therapists 
have specialized in treating only professional dancers due to the unique 
injuries and risk in that profession. 
As with physicians, therapists' primary conflict of inteJ;"est is inherent 
in the entrepreneurial method of reimbursement and acquisition of med-
ical services. All health care providers have one foot in a:n ethic of equal-
ity (serving all patients to the best of one's ability) and another foot in 
an ethic of equity (service according to ability to pay or a plan's prene-
gotiated equity format). In addition, each of the methods of reimburse-
ment carry with it potential conflicts of interest between whatever service 
is provided or denied and the financial well-being of the provider. 
Again, as in most professions, physical therapy generates systemic con-
flicts of interest centered on the therapist's dual roles of adviser and 
provider (Green, 1990; Kipnis, 1986; May, 1996. McDowell, 1991; Rodwin 
1993). Thus, most professionals advise clients about options, help decide 
the best course of action, and then provide the services. The implications 
of adviser-provider conflicts differ according to the payment systems 
within which health professionals function, and those systems are in the 
midst of turmoil on a historic scale. Many options are being experimented 
with, but two main categories are fee for service and managed care. 
In traditional fee-for-service systems, the provider role is a systematic 
incentive to advise for unnecessary services, thereby raising costs dra-
matically. As a general tendency, fee for service brings higher costs for 
patients, unnecessary tests, and unnecessary procedures. Under fee for 
service, the therapists' self-interest is to set goals and timetables that will 
harvest the maximum payment, yet patients' desire to restrict cost as 
much as possible. 
By contrast, in managed health care systems, the costs of providing 
services constitute a systematic incentive not to advise patients of all 
needed services (to minimize usage of services, given that capitation pays 
according to numbers of members rather than usage). In a managed 
care environment, the conflict of interest is between a duration of treat-
ment which is in the best interest of the client and what is permissible 
under the managed care plan. The move to managed care has generated 
many adviser role conflicts for physical therapists: Should therapists in-
form and counsel clients about the true potential and risk in the minimal 
care they are being asked to provide? How about informing clients of 
options that might produce beneficial results but at extra cost for the 
provider? Or, should therapists proceed to limit client expectations to meet 
standardized pathways and time frames? 
The current system encourages providing a minimum level of care 
rather than an optimal level. Economic realities cannot be ignored, but 
concern for the patient must remain paramount. When patients would 
probably profit from additional treatment, they should be so informed. 
Defending the adequacy of a managed care pathway, which is not ac-
curate regarding the individual, is dishonest even if the employer is em-
barrassed. Therapists should not sign contracts that forbid them to ex-
press professional opinions ("gag orders") any more than physicians 
should. 
The primary responsibility of physical therapists is to clients: to pro-
vide quality services and products at reasonable costs within the con-
straints of respect for autonomy. In addition to issues of cost, quality, and 
control, there are related considerations about honesty and maintaining 
the public trust, which often require avoiding even the appearance of 
objectionable conflicts of interest. In addition, there are responsibilities to 
employers, to other professionals with whom one works, and to the gen-
eral public. Exactly when these responsibilities are sufficiently threatened 
requires examination of the dangers arising in particular types of situ-
ations, informed by an understanding of human propensities and histor-
ical settings. 
Finally, the American Physical Therapy Association (APTA) Code of 
Ethics sounds the right note, although it leaves specifics to the judgment 
of individual practitioners. The accompanying "Guide for Professional 
Conduct" explicitly forbids certain types of conflicts of interest (without 
using the expression) (APTA, 2001). For example, section 7.I.B states that 
''.A physical therapist shall never place her/his own financial interest 
above the welfare of individuals under his/her care," and 7.1.F states that 
''.A physical therapist shall not directly or indirectly request, receive, or 
participate in the dividing, transfering, assigning, or rebating of an un-
earned fee." 
Physician Referral 
Physician referral constitutes one of the most discussed issues surround-
ing conflicts of interest in physical therapy, partly owing to historical 
reasons. At one time physical therapists worked more directly under phy-
sicians' supervision. As physical therapy became increasingly profession-
alized (a process still continuing), with greatly augmented skills required 
in both diagnosis and treatment, there was a strong move toward ther-
apists working privately. As a result, referral arrangements began that 
allowed physicians and physical therapists to profit when physicians were 
paid simply for making referrals. 
By the early 1980s there was increasing awareness that the practice 
had serious potential for abuse, and in its grossest forms it constituted 
kickbacks that significantly increased costs to patients, potentially affected 
judgments about quality of services, and threatened a loss of public trust. 
A consensus arose that referral is not itself a service from which physi-
cians should be allowed to profit but essentially a type of kickback ar-
rangement that invites numerous abuses. In 1983, the APTA forbade 
physical therapists from entering into arrangements that allowed physi-
cians (or other referring practitioners) to profit simply from making a 
referral. 
Philip Paul Tygiel (1989) cited many illustrations of instances in 
which patient rights were abused when physicians were allowed to profit 
from referrals. The cases included physicians and therapists alike provid-
ing unnecessary services, low-quality care resulting from f)hysicians not 
focusing on adequate specialization of the therapists they used, and de-
nying patients the therapist they prefer, either individuals or those in 
convenient locations near their home. In one case study, an orthopedic 
surgeon employed a physical therapist who, although well trained in 
treating spinal conditions, did not have an expertise in hand therapy-
even though hand surgery was a primary component of the surgeon's 
practice. Hand therapy and the custom splinting frequently required by 
patients is a highly specialized area of practice for both physical and 
occupational therapists. The surgeon still referred his patients to the ther-
apist in his employment, even though patients frequently had to be re-
ferred again to one of four qualified hand therapists in the community 
for resplinting because the therapist employed by the surgeon lacked the 
special skills needed. The resplinting by a qualified therapist was an ad-
ditional cost to the patient. 
The APTA Code of Ethics has since been clarified and strengthened to 
forbid physical therapists from entering into many problematic referral 
relationships. Regardless of how carefully a code is constructed, however, 
it is not possible for a single document to anticipate all possible variations 
on a common theme. For example, we know of a case in 'which the 
husband is a physician and the wife is a physical therapist. Although 
legally their practices are separate, and therefore withstand the APTA 
definition of conflict of interest, the private and personal perspective 
clearly defines a conflict in which their joint income is enhanced by re-
ferrals from the physician husband to his therapist wife. The physician 
responds that he wants his patients to receive the best physical therapy 
care available, and he believes that is provided by his wife. In this case, 
there is clearly a possibility for abuse. Disclosure to patients by the phy-
sician or therapist should be supplemented with a listing of other ther-
apists in the area with similar training prior to the first appointment. 
A general reading of the intent of section 7.3 in the "Guide for Pro-
fessional Conduct" appears to support the spirit of this recommendation. 
The section states that ''A physical therapist shall disclose to the patient 
if the referring practitioner derives compensation from the provision of 
physical therapy." (APTA, 1997). 
Referral issues have become somewhat more convoluted with man-
aged care where the senior physicians in the health maintenance orga-
nization (HMO) hold ownership of the HMO. Profit is still the concern, 
but this time underuse rather than overuse poses the more serious of-
fense. The dilemma is compounded by the dependent role the physical 
therapist experiences in practice. Although in some states, such as Cali-
fornia, the physical therapist can treat a patient without a physician's 
referral, the vast majority of insurance carriers will not reimburse with-
out the referral. As a result, therapists are financially wedded to physi-
cians, even though they have professionalized themselves to the point to 
which many make independent evaluations and treatments of disabilities. 
This financial tether is somewhat unique, and although it may disperse 
liability and accountability, it has the potential to bind the professional 
judgment of the therapists to a menu of physician-acceptable options. 
Referrals to therapist-owned facilities might not be ethically resolved 
by a simple disclosure of interests. Patients trust therapists as they do 
physicians to act and recommend in the best interest of the patients. The 
trusting relationship is itself diminished if the patient has to monitor the 
provider. To maintain the more comfortable trusting relationship, patients 
ignore confessed disclosures as a required process that may be pertinent 
to others but certainly not to their relationship. 
Equipment and Supplies 
Frequently physical therapists make equipment for patients, such as 
splints and seating inserts. Usually only the therapists who work with 
the patient know their specific needs and have the specialized knowledge 
to order equipment. In private practice it is usual for the therapist to 
charge patients for materials and sometimes the time used to construct 
the equipment. Frequently these therapists supply equipment cheaper 
than that available through specialized vendors, but not always. 
Therapists who fabricate equipment for patients often cite patient ben-
efit as the primary motivation. Because equipment, especially splints, has 
to be custom made in many cases to the specification of the therapists, 
they argue that it is both time efficient and ultimately contributes to a 
better product when therapists do the fabrications. Doing so, they do not 
have to bring another person into the clinic and take the time to com-
municate in detail the patient needs. They also point out that while fab-
ricating a piece of equipment, they are free to respond to unanticipated 
variables and to change the specifications of the equipment and imple-
ment those changes immediately. 
Many therapists charge only for the cost of the materials and their 
customary practice rate, or some fraction thereof, to generate the equip-
ment. There are, however, companies strictly dedicated to the creation of 
these appliances and they are quick to point out that this practice robs 
them of needed income for the task for which they are specifically trained. 
Perhaps, however, there is the greater problem of the appearance of a 
conflict of interest. Therapists can easily fill any downtime with equip-
ment fabrication, thereby securing a secure and steady income in private 
practice. Thus, there is the temptation to create a market for equipment 
with a population that could not possibly get the exact appliance without 
going to another therapist who also manufactures appliances. The appli-
ances are so uniquely a blend of the patient's need and the therapist's 
goal of correction that without the therapist's input, an outside vendor 
would be unable to adequately meet the patient needs. 
Therapists should not have major financial interests in the company 
that supplies them with products they use in practice. However, there is 
an interesting dilemma inherent in this advice. People are advised to 
invest only in areas in which they know the products and the markets. 
If therapists are also good business persons intent on securing extra fi-
nancial security through investments, their fiscal manager might advise 
investing in companies whose products they know to be better than the 
competition's. Thus even though therapists may own stock in those com-
panies from which they make purchases, they are driven by the com-
mitment to provide the best supplies. Only if the company supplies infe-
rior products, offers direct kickbacks, or becomes excessive (as defined by 
reasonable guidelines within organizations and the profession) is the 
stock ownership inherently objectionable. 
Gifts 
The importance of context and of appearances enters into thinking about 
gifts. Principle 4.4 of the APTA's "Guide for Professional Conduct" states: 
''.A physical therapist shall not accept or offer gifts or other considerations 
that affect or give an appearance of affecting his/her professional judg-
ment." This is a good, clear statement, but even so it leaves some areas 
of vagueness. The intent is not to forbid all gifts. That prohibition may 
become necessary in some professional settings, such as the defense in-
dustry. But in physical therapy, as in many other professions, hard and 
fast rules on gifts can cause unexpected negative consequences. 
Many gifts by vendors are "reminder items" that have negligible mon-
etary value. But as a tool to enhance a relationship, their value cannot 
accurately be measured in dollars. Instead, it must be considered relative 
to the subtle influence on the relationship and related decisions. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) allows small gifts, and anyone who 
has attended a health profession conference in this nation has experi-
enced how widespread this practice has become. At APTA conferences, 
as well as at other health-related conferences, the trend has been away 
from promotional gifts which can be used with patients and instead to-
ward gifts specifically for the therapists, often without any relationship 
to the products the vendors sell. 
Other gifts raise different concerns, in both their acceptance and their 
rejection. In most physical therapy settings, the therapist is engaged with 
the client for significant lengths of time, and the quality of that time is 
enhanced by collaborative goal setting and assessment that frequently 
builds a social as well as professional relationship. Clients often see the 
therapist as their primary advocate and sometimes their primary hope 
for restoration of function. As a result, gifts from clients to therapists are 
common, especially in pediatric settings and often insignificant in their 
cost-drawings, homemade cards, and so on. Whereas with vendors 
small gifts may be objectionable because they build a relationship that 
will influence products purchased and used, in this case they appear to 
actually strengthen a component of care and caregiving that is advan-
tageous for the client. 
It is also true that in some cultures gifts are given to health care 
providers out of custom and appreciation, without any intended influence 
to acquire more or better services. In those cases, to refuse such a gift is 
considered an insult. It symbolically states that the giver and the gift are 
unappreciated and thereby disrupts the client-therapist relationship. Be-
cause the type of work that the therapist perform requires maximum 
effort and cooperation from the patient, any action that diminishes the 
trust with the patient potentially diminishes the effectiveness of the in-
tervention. 
At the same time, no therapist is immune to attempts by clients to 
influence them to provide more services in appreciation of a gift. Patients 
sometimes try to influence therapists to continue treatment after the 
point at which, in the therapist's judgment, the patient has the capability 
of benefiting from treatment. As long as the therapist continues to treat 
the patient, many believe that hope for significant recovery or restoration 
of function exists. No one wants patients to abandon realistic hope, nor 
should patients and loved ones cling to false hope when doing so under-
mines efficient use of services or equipment. In these ways, gift giving 
and receiving are caught in the nuanced interplay of hope and honesty 
in ways that call for good judgment rather than fixed rules. 
Cost of the gift is one guide to its intent, but surely it is a fallible guide. 
Gifts must be assessed against the background of the economic situation 
of patients rather than the value relative to the therapist. What may 
appear to be a large gift to one therapist may be an inexpensive expression 
of appreciation by a client, whereas for another client it would be a 
considerable sacrifice. In all these cases one must assess the intent based 
on the history of the relationship and what is known of the client. 
Despite these and other moral nuances of gift giving and receiving, in 
practice the difficulties are not insurmountable. Claudette Finley (1994) 
offers several criteria that handle most cases. Gifts should be expressions 
of gratitude, not manipulation or coercion; they should have minimal 
monetary value; they should not significantly shape relationships with 
vendors; they are best when they benefit people in need; the cost of gifts 
must not be passed on to clients; most important, one should be willing 
to have the gift disclosed to interested parties. 
Inappropriate Sexual Behavior 
Mentioning inappropriate sexual behavior immediately brings to mind 
misconduct initiated by professionals, but in fact patients are also initi-
ators. If not dealt with properly, inappropriate sexual behavior by patients 
creates conflicts of interest for the therapist and threatens performance 
of their responsibilities as health care providers. 
Physical therapists are especially at risk for these behaviors because 
of the close physical contact and prolonged private communication with 
patients. In addition, because of their physical disability and complex 
psychological states triggered by medications, feelings of isolation, and 
damaged self-esteem, patients are frequently in need of reassurance that 
they are desirable and lovable. Usually the therapist intervenes at a time 
in patients' lives when they lack their usual degree of power at work, 
within families, and elsewhere. 
Inappropriate sexual conduct by patients expresses itself on several 
levels (Mccomas, Hebert, Giacomin, Kapla, & Dulberg, 1993). Mildly 
inappropriate sexual behavior by patients, characterized as suggestive 
stories or solicitations for dates may, depending on the setting, best 
be handled by the therapists ignoring or being nonresponsive to the 
behavior, thus in effect escaping from the conflict. Moderate (deliberate 
touching, direct propositions, etc.) and severe (forceful fondling and at-
tempts to secure sexual intercourse) inappropriate sexual behavior by 
patients present the therapist with difficulties as well as temptations. 
According to a study conducted in Canada, 92.9% of surveyed prac-
ticing physical therapists had experienced some level of inappropriate 
patient sexual behavior in the work environment (Mccomas et al., 1993). 
Of those, 32.8 percent of female physical therapists and 37.5 percent of 
male physical therapists had experienced severe inappropriate sexual be-
havior by patients. More than 66 percent of students in physical therapy, 
by the end of their training, had experienced inappropriate sexual be-
havior by patients. In the United States, a national study published in 
1997 found that 86 percent of physical therapists had experienced some 
form of inappropriate sexual behavior by clients and 6 3 percent reported 
at least one incident of sexual harassment by clients (DeMayo, 1997). 
The problem is recognized as sufficiently prevalent that some educational 
institutions are implementing instruction on this subject in their curric-
ulum. 
The role of power is one of the most frequently discussed components 
of sexual harassment, of which sexually inappropriate behavior is a com-
ponent. Paradoxically for therapists, the relevant question is whether 
there is truly a power differential between therapists and patient and, if 
so, who has the power? The patient is dependent on the delivery of service 
by the therapists, but dependency alone does not mean there is a power 
differential in favor of the provider. In restaurants we do not assume that 
the server has an elevated position over the patron even though the 
patron is dependent on the server for the delivery of food. In our health 
care system, the patient is empowered as a consumer. Indeed, within the 
managed care environment in which companies openly compete for pa-
tients, even the doctor's position of power has been usurped, at least in 
the eyes of many consumers of health care. The third-party payer or its 
spokesperson, the health care administrator, is seen by many as the one 
with ultimate authority over the dispensation of care. Although thera-
pists have significant discretionary power, the general public perception 
is increasingly that the business manager controls the physician and the 
physician controls the therapist. 
Clearly no one should be forced to compromise his or her personal or 
professional ethics in the performance of his or her job as health care 
provider. In these cases, it would seem that disclosure to appropriate par-
ties would better secure a just outcome. However, when power is per-
ceived to be with the consumer, it is feared that administrative efforts 
will downplay the offense or even blame the therapist for contributing to 
the situation. Administrators are concerned about keeping patients happy 
with the services provided in order to keep the market share necessary 
for survival and profit. Being portrayed to the public as repressive, lacking 
a sense of humor, or just being plain hard-nosed does not increase sub-
scription rates or ensure continuing contracts. 
In addition, not wishing to bring their own integrity into question, 
many therapists ignore the behavior and fail to report it to supervisors. 
Avoidance of the problem may include requesting another therapist to 
assume the care of that patient for fear that if rejected, the patient may 
retaliate with false charges of inappropriate sexual behavior toward him 
or her. More often, however, therapists who complain about patient be-
havior to supervisors are awarded the status of a whistleblower concern-
ing an institutional secret. The therapist is left alone without any realistic 
means of protecting him- or herself or achieving fairness. 
The institutional response should focus on the long-term survival of 
the organization. That means recognizing that the health care worker 
should be afforded the same protections from patients that are already 
assured legally to coworkers. Substantial numbers of therapists simply 
will not stay in an employment setting in which their personal integrity 
is sacrificed for the business of health care. When therapists are harmed 
by patient behaviors, the quality of care is diminished, either through 
avoidance or through stringent risk-reduction efforts. To meet expecta-
tions of quality care delivery and to maintain a stable work force, health 
care organizations must make it clear to patients and staff that sexual 
harassment policies extend to patients as well as to staff. 
Regrettably, on occasion therapists solicit sexual favors from patients. 
These patients may perceive that the quality of care is dependent on their 
compliance with inappropriate requests. Beyond issues of coercion, there 
is the far more troubling matter of maintaining trust. Patients typically 
assume that professionals are obligated to set aside personal opinions and 
self-serving motivations to provide optimal and objective care. When the 
therapist diminishes the trust built on that assumption, all who share the 
assumption are damaged to the extent that they are aware of the vio-
lation. There is an unanticipated and unacceptable cost to the patient for 
the services requested. 
What about situations in which sexual attraction is mutual and ap-
preciated? Is there harm to the patient, the therapist, or the institution 
that provides the care? One troublesome part of this situation when there 
is no easily defined victim is the issue of the genuineness of a relationship. 
Formal roles (therapist, patient) can eclipse important values that support 
lasting committed relationships often desired by the parties. But even if 
we have no interest in protecting the genuineness and duration of rela-
tionships, we have concerns when the purpose of the organization is 
subverted by personal interests. A health care service environment is by 
necessity tightly focused on the services and equipment linked to the 
delivery of care. It has nothing to gain but potential problems and lia-
bilities by allowing behaviors unrelated to its mission. 
Teaching and Research 
Physical therapists who are also professors of physical therapy have new 
roles and hence new conflicts. Like other professors, professors of physical 
therapy have enormous demands from their research, consulting, and 
family that can threaten teaching responsibilities. Exactly how much 
time, effort, and skill are morally obligatory in the teacher role is con-
testable, thereby inviting temptations to give more attention to prestige-
promoting publication at the cost of students. But there are threats to 
research as well, and in general the compensation motives of personal 
income, job security, and prestige present threats to role responsibilities 
in academia, as they do in serving patients. 
There are also episodic conflicts of interest shared with other profes-
sors, such as having sexual affairs with students in their classes. Are they 
threatening their ability to grade fairly-threatening it sufficiently to call 
for university policy in the matter? In our view, decidedly yes, and that 
applies not only to the university environment but also to instructors in 
the clinic setting who teach students as a part of the university program. 
But others disagree, and many schools continue not to have policies for-
bidding such affairs. Values of freedom, sexual and otherwise, are invoked 
to prevent anything stronger than legally mandated sexual harassment 
policies. 
Additional conflicts of interest arise in accepting, rejecting, and su-
pervising student internships. Physical therapy students must complete a 
number of months in the clinic treating patients under the supervision 
of a licensed physical therapist in an employment setting approved by 
the educational institution. The intent is that the student will be taught 
many clinical skills, designated by the APTA accreditation standards as 
part of the eligibility requirements to take the state licensing exam. Es-
pecially in a managed care environment, many therapists are simply re-
fusing to take students because of productivity standards that leave little 
or no time to supervise students, thereby adding to universities' difficul-
ties in finding internship sites. In other cases, students are treated as 
revenue-generating personnel with little if any instruction. Because the 
latter is the only situation in which the educational facility has gover-
nance, schools regularly interview students and conduct onsite visits to 
ensure that students receive instruction and are not used solely to in-
crease revenue at the expense and safety of patients. However, as clinical 
sites continue to diminish, educational institutions will be increasingly 
tempted to rationalize inadequate supervision as better than having to 
create new university-sponsored clinics to supply the experiences neces-
sary for completing the educational program. 
Currently, an area of great concern is the selection of candidates for 
educational programs. The number of applicants to schools of physical 
therapy have recently decreased, secondary to cost-saving measures in 
managed care. Simultaneously, the number of accredited physical therapy 
programs in the United States has increased, rendering some schools un-
able to fill their class quotas. Like most businesses, university departments 
are staffed and funded on the basis of anticipated enrollment and accom-
panying tuition revenue. Compounding the dilemma, academic programs 
are encouraged by the APTA, or even required, as by the California chap-
ter of the APTA, to convert existing programs to award a doctorate in 
physical therapy as the entry-level degree program. This is a transition 
with considerable costs in terms of labor and material resources. 
Taken together, these pressures intensify commitments to select only 
competent students who with education will be able to pass licensure 
examinations, at the same time keeping enrollment levels adequate to 
ensure the survival of the department. In addition, the educational 
institutions serve as the gatekeepers to the profession and have a duty 
to the profession to populate it with competent professionals. Some 
schools have responded to these financial threats by increasing their re-
cruitment programs, but it is feared that as competition increases for a 
diminished pool of applicants, compromises in admission standards are 
inevitable. 
Even the method of selecting candidates is controversial. Basic aca-
demic abilities and skills needed to complete the academic program are 
clearly needed, but what additional standards are needed? Should the 
educational institutions focus only on the recruitment a~Jd training of 
future clinicians when there are other areas of the profession such as 
research that are seriously deficient? Given the extreme'ly diverse areas 
of specialization within clinical applications, combined with the employ-
ment opportunities in teaching, supervision, and case management, the 
task of defining valid admission criteria in addition to academic standards 
is daunting. Restricting the student population too narrowly, through 
rigid entrance requirements of voluntary clinical experience, does a dis-
service to the profession, but to apply no standards invites inappropriate 
academic recruitment to fill revenue needs. 
In all university teaching, research responsibilities are important in 
their own right, as well as their general contribution to teaching. Physical 
therapy is criticized for failing to provide documentation that treatment 
methods pass accepted standards of scientific inquiry for efficacy, and 
professors share a responsibility toward the profession to help remedy 
that. Practitioners also have this duty but the conflicts are significant. 
Especially in a managed care environment, therapists' first obligation is 
to provide the best care to the patients who depend on them. The patient 
loads and time allotted typically eliminate any hope of conducting valid 
scientific enquiry in the true experimental model. Even quasi-
experimental models require more time and planning than most thera-
pists in clinical practice can be expected to accommodate. Iri the univer-
sity, typically physical therapy faculty carry heavier teaching loads than 
most other faculty and have limited resources to finance efficacy studies 
either at a public or a private level. The focus of research dollars remains, 
and one could argue rightly, on the most expensive elements of health 
care, namely, pharmacy and surgical interventions. 
Even when funds and opportunities are available, there has been a 
reluctance to engage in double-blind studies on the grounds that it is 
unethical to deny treatment. That would at some level be correct if it 
were known that the treatment had an effect. Controlling for bias is 
essential given the placebo effect of treatment and researcher bias in 
therapy. In the absence of that knowledge, one has to question the ethics 
of providing care that may be of no benefit to tens of thousands of 
patients and the consequential opportunity cost to the patient of alter-
nate care that may provide some benefit or simply avoiding the costs 
incurred. Thus the most meaningful conflict is the one between current 
beliefs and the reality of unsupported promises. There is also the suspi-
cion that research is neglected because it might show procedures to be 
inefficacious, possibly eliminating some components of practice in phys-
ical therapy. 
Conclusion 
The topic of conflicts of interest is a prism for exploring both the core 
commitments and historic variations of professions. We have highlighted 
examples of enduring issues centered on the public goods served by phys-
ical therapists, such as provider-adviser conflicts and also issues arising 
from historically contingent institutional structures and economic set-
tings, such as managed health care. Although we commented on possible 
solutions, our discussion reflected our conviction that the primary moral 
challenge is to identify and render salient areas in which conflicts of 
interest are recurring and especially likely to cause harm. 
In addition, the topic of conflicts of interest is a prism for exploring 
areas of shared and distinctive features of professions. Thus, some con-
flicts of interest in physical therapy are shared with all professions (gift 
accepting), some are shared with other health professions in particular 
(adviser-provider conflicts within managed health care), some are shared 
with other allied health care professionals (physician referral), some have 
special relevance to physical therapy (patient-intitiated sexual overtures), 
and some are akin to other professions but have unique variations in 
physical therapy (equipment and supplies). These prism effects are not 
surprising given that conflicts of interest, by definition, involve threats to 
role responsibilities. 
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